were merely sounds, and that the divine being coincided with his “nonbegottenness”
(
ἀ
γεννησια
). This one attribute, he believed, made all the others superfluous and useless.105 The
Anthropomorphites of earlier and later date rejected the simplicity of God inasmuch as they
ascribed a body to God. Arabian philosophers held to the simplicity of God but used it as a means
of opposing the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, since according to them the three persons were
simply “names added to the substance.”106 Duns Scotus, who for that matter expressly taught the
doctrine of God’s simplicity,107 came into conflict with it insofar as he assumed that the attributes
are formally distinct from each other as well as from the divine essence.108 Nominalism, being
even much more radical, held that there were realistic distinctions between the attributes among
themselves. In the period of the Reformation this view was adopted by the Socinians. In the
interest of assuring the independence of humans, they arrived at the idea of finitizing the divine
being and as a result were at a loss to knowwhat to do with God’s simplicity. Socinus questioned
whether Scripture permits us to ascribe simplicity to God. The Catechism of Rakow totally omits
this attribute. Schlichting, Volkelius (et al.) denied that the attributes coincide with God’s being
and asserted that a fullness of attributes is not inconsistent with his oneness.109 Vorstius,
agreeing with this view and basing himself especially on the doctrine of the Trinity, stated that
with reference to the divine being we must distinguish between matter and form, essence and
attributes, genus and differentiae. Scripture, accordingly, reports that God swore “by his soul”
(Jer. 51:14 MT) and that the Spirit is “within him” (1 Cor. 2:11). There is a difference, said Vorstius,
between knowing and willing, between the subject that lives and the life by which the subject
lives.110
The Remonstrants were of the same opinion. In the second chapter of their Confession they said
that Scripture does not contain a single syllable about the simplicity of God, that it is a purely
metaphysical doctrine and not at all necessary for Christians to believe. They especially raised the
objection that the idea of the simplicity of God is incompatible with the freedom of his will and
the changing character of his disposition. While Episcopius still listed the simplicity of God
among the attributes and believed that the “relations, volitions, and free decrees” could be
harmonized with it,111 Limborch no longer mentioned it. In rationalistic works it was either
completely relegated to the background or left undiscussed altogether.112 Bretschneider writes
that Scripture knows nothing of these philosophical subtleties.
Nor was pantheism able to recognize or appreciate the doctrine of God’s simplicity. It equated
God with the world, while Spinoza, one of its exponents, even attributed to God the attribute of
extension. Thus the attribute of God’s simplicity almost totally disappeared from modern
theology. Its significance is no longer understood, and sometimes it is vigorously opposed.
Schleiermacher refused to put the simplicity of God on a par with the other attributes, regarding
it only as “the unseparated and inseparable mutual inherence of all divine attributes and
activities.”113 In the works of Lange, Kahnis, Philippi, Ebrard, Lipsius, Biedermann, F. A. B.
Nitzsch, Kaftan, von Oettingen, Haering, van Oosterzee (et al.), this attribute no longer occurs.
